Engineering Infrastructure as a Weapon of Foreign Interference
Engineering infrastructure, particularly in the context of large-scale projects like dams, bridges, and energy facilities, has increasingly become a potent tool of foreign influence and interference in a country’s domestic affairs.
Globally acclaimed examples include China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), where infrastructure investments in countries like Sri Lanka and Pakistan have led to significant debt dependencies, allowing China to exert considerable influence over these nations’ policies. Similarly, Ethiopia’s Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has given Ethiopia strategic control over the Nile’s flow, impacting Egypt’s water security and highlighting the potential for infrastructure to alter regional power dynamics. Russia’s energy infrastructure, particularly its gas pipelines to Europe, also exemplifies how control over essential resources can be used to influence foreign governments and secure geopolitical advantages.
These observations demonstrate that major public infrastructure can be leveraged as tools of geopolitical strategy, shaping not only economies but also the political sovereignty of nations involved.
The Bangladesh Context
The recent release of water from the Dumbur Dam, which led to catastrophic flooding in Bangladesh, cannot be dismissed as an unavoidable or purely “automatic” event.
India’s recent response to allegations regarding the impact of the Dumbur Dam on flooding in Bangladesh reflects a broader pattern of deflecting responsibility in transboundary water management. While Indian Minsitry of External Affairs attributed the floods primarily to heavy rainfall in downstream catchment areas, which led to the automatic release of water from the dam. Any expert in or on the field, would know that there is a 300-page technical document guiding the regulation of functional capabilities of any enginering asset.
The Tripura State Disaster Management Plan, produced by the Tripura Disaster Management Authority, clearly outlines that the decision to use automation in dam operations is a state-controlled policy. This means that the state, not an impersonal system, is ultimately responsible for the actions taken by the dam. The policy also details specific safeguards intended to prevent such disasters, yet these were blatantly ignored. Automation, as prescribed in the guide, is meant to enhance safety and predictability, not to serve as an excuse for negligence.
In the absence of detailed sources on this specific incident, a UN Situation Report from just two days ago, highlighted the catastrophic consequences of subsequent floods in northern Bangladesh impacting 3.74 million people, including 1.65 million children. These figures underscore the severe risks associated with inadequate water management and infrastructure control in and around the region.
The failure to conduct proper checks and balances, especially when automation is in place, points to a significant lapse in state responsibility. India’s attempt to deflect blame by attributing the disaster to the very system it controls is not only disingenuous but also a grave injustice to the millions of lives impacted downstream in Bangladesh.
This incident underscores the need for greater accountability and transparency in transboundary water management, particularly when the consequences of neglect are so devastating. The guide clearly states coordination and communication with Bangladeshi authorities to signal dam operations, so it seems like India’s own policy document has the External Affairs Ministry on check.
My question: why have we seen increasing releases of water from Indian dams despite supposed improvements in bilateral relations over the past 15 years?
The answer: Bangladesh’s foreign policy failure to finalize a comprehensive water-sharing agreement, despite years of negotiations with India.
The correct answer: A complete farce and facade of bi-lateral relationship building while handing out access to vital resources, and jeopardizing the wellbeing of poor people in rural areas, in exchange for political backing.
As Yunus meets with India’s Minister of External Affairs to discuss a path forward, he will inevitably address the bordering issues at hand, but he must also keep China and the United States in mid.
India & China + U.S.A
The Teesta River dispute and the broader implications of Chinese involvement in Bangladesh’s infrastructure development highlight how infrastructure can be weaponized to influence domestic politics and bilateral relations.
The Teesta River is vital for Bangladesh’s agricultural sector, particularly in the northern regions. However, India’s construction of dams and canals upstream has significantly reduced the flow of water into Bangladesh, especially during the dry season. This has led to severe irrigation shortages, affecting crop production and the livelihoods of millions of people.
Previously, Bangladesh had merely expressed frustration over India’s unilateral actions, which are seen as a violation of international norms governing transboundary rivers. The strategic use of infrastructure in the Bangladesh-India context also raises significant concerns regarding the violation of international laws.
Under the UN Watercourses Convention of 1997, principles such as equitable and reasonable utilization and the obligation not to cause significant harm are critical to managing shared water resources. India’s control over the Teesta River, with its significant reduction in water flow to Bangladesh, potentially violates these principles, undermining Bangladesh’s ability to access its fair share of water.
In response to the challenges posed by India’s control over the Teesta, Bangladesh has increasingly looked to China for support. China has offered to assist Bangladesh in dredging and embanking the Teesta River, promising a more manageable and controlled water flow within Bangladesh’s borders.
This move, however, is not without its geopolitical implications. India’s concerns about Chinese involvement in Bangladesh’s infrastructure projects reflect the broader strategic competition between the two Asian giants.
China’s involvement in Bangladesh’s infrastructure is part of a larger pattern of using engineering projects to gain influence in South Asia. Through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has invested heavily in infrastructure across the region, creating dependencies that can be leveraged to exert political influence. In Bangladesh, this dynamic is evident in projects like the Padma Bridge and the Karnaphuli Tunnel, which are critical to the country’s economic development but also tie it closer to China.
The securitization of water resources — where water management becomes a matter of national security — complicates Bangladesh’s ability to negotiate fair terms with its neighbors. The control of water through infrastructure such as dams and barrages gives upstream countries like India significant leverage, which can be used to influence domestic politics in downstream countries like Bangladesh.
Yes, China’s offer to assist with water management could be seen as an attempt to gain favor with the Bangladeshi government, potentially at the expense of its relations with India. But on the other hand, as seen with sentiments across social and national media this past week, during times of political instability in Bangladesh, the manipulation of water flows by India could exacerbate internal crises, putting additional pressure on a Bangladesh government busy with other priorities, such as rolling-out a nation-wide reform agenda.
Where China and India are asserting their influence, the United States inevitably follows, often seeking to provide a counterbalance. I was at the OECD Infrastructure Forum in Paris this April when the U.S. introduced the Blue Dot Network — a U.S. certified seal of approval for infrastructure projects in the global south.
This initiative aligns with Biden’s Build Back Better World (B3W) Initiative and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, all designed to offer high-standard, transparent alternatives to China’s investment model in developing countries. On this note, Bangladesh must think twice before rolling out the red carpet for the World Bank and IMF, who are quick to offer privatization solutions under guise of a democracy and redevelopment campaign.
While these international financial institutions often advocate for privatization to enhance efficiency and attract foreign investment, such measures must be carefully weighed to ensure they do not compromise national sovereignty or lead to excessive foreign control through development finance over critical sectors.
The Yunus administration is well advised, to approach such offers with a strategic mindset, ensuring that any privatization efforts are aligned with Bangladesh’s long-term national interests.
Back to Basics
If I remember my lectures correctly, the theories of realism, dependency theory, and securitization offer valuable lenses to understand the geopolitical dynamics at play.
Realism emphasizes the pursuit of national interest and power, suggesting that countries like India and China use infrastructure as a means to enhance their strategic influence over neighboring states.
Dependency theory highlights how powerful nations can create economic dependencies through infrastructure investments, which can then be leveraged for political control.
Securitization theory explains how states can transform infrastructure projects into issues of national security, thus justifying extraordinary measures to control and influence outcomes in dependent nations.
In the context of Bangladesh-India relations, these theories elucidate how infrastructure becomes more than just a development tool — it becomes a strategic asset for exerting influence and control.
Be it from India, China or the United States of America.